1.1 Semantic reference.   A name or a proper noun is often said to be an expression designating a particular person, place, thing, etc. That traditional characterization is useful in a rough and ready way, but ignores two very important ideas: (1) An expression like the President of the United States in 2003 designates a particular person, but would not usually be called a name. Technically it is not a proper noun, because though it designates uniquely, it does not display the grammatical features required. (2) Expressions generally called proper nouns, such as George and London, do not in fact designate particular persons or particular places. Many people have been and are now called George, and in addition to the original London in England, many other locations now bear that name; in North America there are Londons in Kentucky, Ohio, and Ontario. So on the one hand besides naming there are other ways to designate particular persons, places, etc., and on the other, proper nouns are not strictly particular in their designations.

What characterizes names semantically is not what they refer to, but more accurately how they refer. The President of the United States in 2003 refers to a particular person by mentioning two attributes that the person must have in order to be so designated, namely, ‘holding the office of President in the United States of America’ and ‘holding that office in the year 2003’. On the other hand, the name George designates any person who happens to be so called, without any characteristics being necessary (not even that of having the name!). Even if no one has ever used the expression the President of the United States in 2003 to refer to George W. Bush, he would still be the referent because he meets the characteristics specified in it. However, if a man has not been named George and/or no one has ever called him that, he cannot be so designated felicitously. Semantically, names are expressions used to designate a person, place, or thing that people have agreed to call by that label. It implies no characteristics beyond the use of the name to designate its referent. The name George serves to denote ‘a person conventionally called George’ and nothing more.